In the passage, the narrator most nearly describes Kafka as someone who: mysteries. symbols. Passage II SOCIAL SCIENCE: This passage is adapted from The Little Ice Age: How Climate Made History, 1300–1850 by Brian Fagan (©2000 by Brian Fagan). Speak the words “ice age,” and the mind turns to Cro-Magnon mammoth hunters on windswept European plains devoid of trees. But the Little Ice Age (approxi- mately A.D. 1300–1850) was far from a deep freeze. Think instead of an irregular seesaw of rapid climatic shifts, driven by complex and still little understood interactions between the atmosphere and the ocean. The seesaw brought cycles of intensely cold winters and easterly winds, then switched abruptly to years of heavy spring and early summer rains, mild winters, and frequent Atlantic storms, or to periods of droughts, light northeasterly winds, and summer heat waves that baked growing corn fields under a shimmering haze. The Little Ice Age was an endless zigzag of climatic shifts, few lasting more than a quarter century. Today’s prolonged warming is an anomaly. Reconstructing the climate changes of the past is extremely difficult, because reliable instrument records are but a few centuries old. For earlier times, we have but what are called proxy records reconstructed from incomplete written accounts, tree rings, and ice cores. Country clergy and amateur scientists with time on their hands sometimes kept weather records over long periods. Chronicles like those of the eighteenth-century diarist John Evelyn or monastery scribes are invaluable for their remarks on unusual weather, but their useful- ness in making comparisons is limited. Remarks like “the worst rain storm in memory,” or “hundreds of fish- ing boats overwhelmed by mighty waves” do not an accurate meteorological record make, even if they made a deep impression at the time. The traumas of extreme weather events fade rapidly from human consciousness. Many New Yorkers still vividly remember the great heat wave of Summer 1999, but it will soon fade from collective memory, just like the great New York bliz- zard of 1888, which stranded hundreds of people in Grand Central station and froze dozens to death in deep snowdrifts. A generation ago, we had a generalized impression of Little Ice Age climate compiled with painstaking care from a bewildering array of historical sources and a handful of tree-ring sequences. Today, the scatter of tree-ring records has become hundreds from throughout the Northern Hemisphere and many from south of the equator, too, amplified with a growing body of temper- ature data from ice cores drilled in Antarctica, Green- land, the Peruvian Andes, and other locations. We can now track the Little Ice Age as an intricate tapestry of short-term climatic shifts that rippled through European society during times of remarkable change—centuries that saw Europe emerge from medieval fiefdom and pass by stages through the Renaissance, the Age of Dis- covery, the Enlightenment, the French and Industrial revolutions, and the making of modern Europe. To what extent did those climatic shifts alter the course of European history? Many archaeologists and historians are suspicious of the role of climate change in changing human societies—and with good reason. Environmental determinism, the notion that climate change was a primary cause of major developments like, say, agriculture, has been a dirty word in academia for generations. You certainly cannot argue that climate drove history in a direct and causative way to the point of toppling governments. Nor, however, can you con- tend that climate change is something that you can totally ignore. Throughout the Little Ice Age, into the nineteenth century, millions of European peasants lived at the subsistence level. Their survival depended on crop yields: cycles of good and poor harvests, of cooler and wetter spring weather, could make a crucial differ- ence between hunger and plenty, life and death. The sufficiency or insufficiency of food was a powerful motivator of human action, sometimes on a national or even continent-wide scale, with consequences that could take decades to unfold. Consider, for instance, the food crises that engulfed Europe during the Little Ice Age—the great hunger of 1315 to 1319, the food dearths of 1741, and 1816, “the year without a summer”—to mention only a few. These crises in themselves did not threaten the continued existence of Western civilization, but they surely played an important role in the formation of modern Europe. Some of these crises resulted from cli- matic shifts, others from human ineptitude or disastrous economic or political policy; many from a combination of all three. Environmental determinism may be intel- lectually bankrupt, but climate change is the ignored player on the historical stage.
